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I. INTRODUCTION
Reverse payment agreements,1 in which a brand-name drug
manufacturer makes a payment to a generic drug manufacturer to settle a
patent dispute, have saved consumers billions of dollars by allowing
generic manufacturers to enter the market before the brand-name’s patent
has expired.2 A current debate in the pharmaceutical industry is the
legality of reverse payment agreements in Hatch-Waxman litigation.3
The crux of this dispute is whether reverse payment agreements amount
to antitrust violations, effectively limiting trade.4 Many parties,
including politicians and legal scholars, have attempted to tackle this
issue but have yet to reach a consensus that balances both patent law and
antitrust law concerns.5 In addition to the political and scholarly debate,
the issue has also created a split in the federal courts.6
This Comment advocates for the continued legality of reverse
payment agreements and explores the regulatory background that has
encouraged them.7 Recent court decisions favor the continued legality of
reverse payment settlements.8 Moreover, these settlement agreements
should be permitted as they effectuate the purpose of the Hatch Waxman
Act, increasing market access for generic pharmaceutical manufacturers.9
By refusing to allow such settlements, the purpose of the HWA is
frustrated through creating an environment that discourages settlement
and thus prevents access to generic manufacturers for a longer period of
1

Christopher M. Holman, Do Reverse Payment Settlements Violate the Antitrust
Laws?, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 489, 494 (2007). The “reverse”
designation refers to the fact that the patent holder is paying the alleged infringer, rather
than vice versa. Id.
2
Sheila Kadura, Note, Is an Absolute Ban on Reverse Payments the Appropriate
Way to Prevent Anticompetitive Agreements Between Branded-and GenericPharmaceutical Companies?, 86 TEX. L. REV. 647, 651–52 (2008). When a generic form
of a drug enters the market it is able to offer a lower price because of lower development
costs, while at the same time creating competition in the market. Id.
3
Erica N. Andersen, Note, Schering the Market: Analyzing the Debate over
Reverse-Payment Settlements in the Wake of the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003
and In re Tamoxifen Citrate Litigation, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1015, 1018 (2008).
4
See infra Part IV.
5
Andersen, supra note 3, at 1027–28. Patent law and antitrust law, for practical
purposes, are opposed to each other. Id. While patent law grants a right of exclusion,
antitrust law promotes competition and equal access. Id.
6
See infra Part IV.
7
See infra Part II.
8
Joblove v. Barr Labs., Inc. (In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig.), 466 F.3d 187
(2d Cir. 2006); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., 344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003);
Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005); Ark. Carpenters Health
& Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG (In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig.), 544
F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
9
See infra Part V.
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time. Finally, a blanket declaration that all reverse payments are per se
illegal is not a sound rule because it cuts against our judicial system’s
fundamental policy in favor of settlement.10
II. THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT
In 1984, Congress enacted the Drug Price Competition and Patent
Term Restoration Act of 1984, commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman
Act (HWA or “the Act”).11 The purpose of the HWA was to accelerate
the approval process for low-cost generic versions of established drugs.12
Specifically, the HWA added subsection (j) to 21 U.S.C. § 355, which
described the process for an Abbreviated New Drug Application
(ANDA).13 This amendment allows generic drug manufacturers to
obtain approval for a bioequivalent14 form of a drug that has already been
approved for safety and effectiveness.15 As a result, generic
manufacturers can bring a new drug to market at a much lower cost
because the regulatory and testing process is far less comprehensive.16
When filing an ANDA, a generic manufacturer must file one of
four types of certification regarding the already existing drug to which
the generic manufacturer claims bioequivalence.17 A paragraph IV
certification, which certifies that the brand-name’s patent is invalid or
10
In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 202 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting
the courts analysis would proceed under a longstanding preference for the settlement of
litigation).
11
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-Waxman) Act of
1984, 22 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2006), 98 Pub. L. No.98–417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as
scattered sections of titles 21 and 35 of the United States Code); In re Tamoxifen Citrate
Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d at 191.
12
In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d at 191.
13
Id.; 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2006).
14
21 C.F.R. § 320.1(e) (2010) (“Bioequivalence means the absence of a significant
difference in the rate and extent to which the active ingredient or active moiety in
pharmaceutical equivalents or pharmaceutical alternatives becomes available at the site of
drug action when administered at the same molar dose under similar conditions in an
appropriately designed study.”).
15
In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d at 191; David W. Opderbeck,
Rational Competition Policy and Reverse Payment Settlements in Hatch-Waxman Patent
Litigation, 98 GEO. L.J. 1303, 1307 (2010).
16
Opderbeck, supra note 15, at 1307.
17
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (2006); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466
F.3d at 191 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (2006)) (“An ANDA filer must certify,
with respect to each patent that claims the listed drug for the bioequivalent of which the
ANDA filer is seeking approval, either that no patent was filed for the listed drug (a
‘paragraph I’ certification), that the patent has expired (a ‘paragraph II’ certification), that
the patent will expire on a specified date and the ANDA filer will not market the drug
until that date (a ‘paragraph III’ certification), or that the patent is invalid or would not be
infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug (a ‘paragraph IV’
certification).”
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would not be infringed by the generic’s product, brings up a unique set of
issues and is the type of certification involved in Hatch-Waxman
litigation.18 When a paragraph IV ANDA is filed, the filer must notify
the affected patent owner of the certification, which enables that patent
owner to bring suit against the ANDA filer for patent infringement
within forty-five days.19 In fact, the filing of a paragraph IV certification
is a per se act of patent infringement.20 If the patent owner does not
bring a lawsuit, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is free to
approve the ANDA immediately.21 But if the patent owner chooses to
bring a lawsuit, the FDA will stay the ANDA approval for thirty months
or until the court returns a decision regarding the validity of the patent or
its infringement.22 This type of certification often leads a pioneering
drug manufacturer, which holds the patent for the drug in question, to
enter into a settlement agreement and make a reverse payment to the
generic manufacturer.23 This reverse payment is made to not only end
the litigation, but also to establish the time when the generic
manufacturer can enter the market.24
The HWA provides important incentives to generic drug
manufacturers for choosing paragraph IV certification.25 First, the HWA
allows challenges to already existing patents without the risk of incurring
infringement damage costs as long as the generic drug has not been
marketed.26 Second, the first ANDA filer of a paragraph IV certification
will usually be entitled to an exclusivity period during which the FDA
cannot approve any other ANDA filer until 180 days after: (1) the first
day the first filer commercially markets the drug; or (2) a court
determines that the patent in question is invalid or has not been
infringed.27 These tremendously important incentives are the driving
reasons for the rise of settlement agreements and reverse payments
18

21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (2006); Opderbeck, supra note 15, at 1307.
In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d at 191 (citing 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(j)(2)(B) (2006)).
20
35 U.S.C.S. § 271(e)(2)(A) (LexisNexis 2010) (“It shall be an act of infringement
to submit an application under section 505(j) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act [21 USCS § 355(j) . . . .”); Martin S. Masar III, Article, Effects of the Federal Circuit
Judges on Hatch-Waxman Litigation, 19 DEPAUL J. ART TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 315,
322 (2009).
21
In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d at 191 (citing 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(j)(2)(B)).
22
Id.
23
Opderbeck, supra note 15, at 1307–08.
24
Id. at 1308.
25
In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d at 192; Opderbeck, supra note
15, at 1307.
26
Opderbeck, supra note 15, at 1308.
27
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(4)(B)(iv)(I)–(II) (2006).
19
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between pioneering and generic drug manufacturers because the
“[p]aragraph IV process changes the ordinary risk calculus for patent
litigation,” as “[t]he patent owner risks losing its patent, but the alleged
infringer does not risk a damage award.”.28
III. SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS AND REVERSE PAYMENTS
Due to the incentives provided for generic drug manufacturers
under the HWA, which encourage the filing of an ANDA under
paragraph IV, brand-name drug companies are compelled to protect their
exclusive patent rights.29 Brand-name drug companies have done this by
negotiating compromises with their generic competitors through
settlement agreements and reverse payments.30 These settlements are
further encouraged by the fact that generic manufacturers have much to
gain and little to lose by challenging the patent, while the exact opposite
is true for brand-name manufacturers.31
A reverse payment “has been used as shorthand to characterize a
variety of diverse patent settlement agreements that involve a transfer of
consideration from the patent owner to the alleged infringer.”32 The
reverse designation refers to the fact that the payments flow from the
patent holder to the alleged infringer, in contrast to settlements in typical
patent litigation cases where payments flows from the alleged patent
infringer to the patent holder.33 A reverse payment settlement will
generally require the generic drug company to refrain from producing a
generic form of a drug in return for monetary payment.34 While the
28

Opderbeck, supra note 15, at 1307.
Wansheng Jerry Liu, Balancing Accessibility and Sustainability: How to Achieve
the Dual Objectives of the Hatch-Waxman Act While Resolving Antitrust Issues in
Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement Cases, 18 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 441, 460 (2008).
30
Id.
31
Id. at 459–60. The brand-name manufacturer, as the holder of the New Drug
Application (NDA), has limited remedies when successful in HWA litigation. Id. at 459.
If the court holds the brand’s patent to be invalid or that the generic’s use is not
infringing, the FDA approves the ANDA and the generic begins to market its version of
the drug, which reduces the brand’s market share. Id. at 459–60. Even if the court holds
the patent to be valid, the NDA holder is still likely to lose profits, because of lower
prices and the loss of consumer loyalty. Id. at 460. Although the brand could force the
generic out, the brand often will not do this for fear of ruining its public image, as
consumers rely on the lower priced generic. Id. The circumstances are very different for
the generic. Id. The generic stands to gain a tremendous profit by winning in litigation,
but if it loses, those losses will be relatively small because it has practically no research
and development costs to recoup. Id. These low research costs enable the generic to
afford the millions of dollars required to litigate. Id. Therefore, the HWA sets up an
environment where generics stand to gain greatly and lose little by litigating. Id.
32
Holman, supra note 1, at 494.
33
Holman, supra note 1, at 494.
34
Opderbeck, supra note 15, at 1307–08.
29
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specifics of an agreement will vary on a case-by-case basis, these
settlements often address the length of the generic marketing restriction,
the market exclusivity period, and other licensing issues.35 The most
radical form of settlement is one that terminates litigation and forces the
generic manufacturer to wait until the patent expires to enter the
market.36 In most cases, however, the patent holder and the generic
company agree to some sort of reduction to the remaining patent term.37
Term splitting most often results in the generic drug entering the market
earlier than the point in which the patent would have originally expired,
but later than would have been possible had the generic company won
the litigation by proving the patent invalid.38
IV. PROBLEMS ARISING FROM REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS
Reverse payments have been the subject of antitrust suits in
multiple federal circuit courts and have resulted in a circuit split
regarding the legality of the payments.39 These cases involve actions
brought by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and private antitrust
actions brought by interested third parties.40 The FTC has begun to
equate reverse payments with market allocation agreements,41 which
traditionally have been per se antitrust violations in cases not involving
patents.42 The private antitrust actions often closely follow FTC
actions.43
Currently, there are four different opinions in the federal circuit
courts regarding the legality of reverse payment settlements.44 The
Second Circuit has reasoned that reverse payments are legal based on
judicial policy that favors settlement.45 The Sixth Circuit has held that

35

Id.
Holman, supra note 1, at 494.
37
Id. at 495; Opderbeck, supra note 15, at 1308.
38
Holman, supra note 1, at 495.
39
Opderbeck, supra note 15, at 1308.
40
Id.
41
United States v. Topco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972). A market allocation
agreement is an agreement between competitors at the same level of the market made to
minimize competition. Id.
42
Holman, supra note 1, at 531–32.
43
Opderbeck, supra note 15, at 1308.
44
Joblove v. Barr Labs., Inc. (In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig.), 466 F.3d 187
(2d Cir. 2006); La. Wholesale Drug Co. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc. (In re Cardizem
CD Antitrust Litig.), 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms.,
344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003); Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir.
2005); Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG (In re Ciprofloxacin
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig.), 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
45
See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187.
36
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reverse payments are per se unlawful.46 The Eleventh Circuit has
developed an approach that tests the exclusionary powers of a patent.47
Finally, the Federal Circuit has determined that reverse payments are
presumed legal because they are within the scope of the protection
powers provided by a patent.48
A. The Second Circuit
In In re Tamoxifen Citrate Litigation, the Second Circuit held that
reverse payments should remain legal because the agreement did not give
rise to an antitrust violation.49 The case provided an opportunity for the
court to look at “issues at the intersection of intellectual property law and
antitrust law.”50 Additionally, the court noted that although “the
particular factual circumstances of this case are unlikely to recur, the
issues presented have been much litigated and appear to retain their
vitality.”51
Imperial Chemical Industries, PLC (“ICI”) developed Tamoxifen, a
breast cancer drug, and passed ownership of the resulting patent to
Zeneca, Inc. and its subsidiaries (collectively referred to as “Zeneca”).52
In December 1985, four months after ICI was awarded the Tamoxifen
patent, Barr Labs, Inc. (“Barr”) filed an ANDA requesting FDA approval
to market a generic form of Tamoxifen.53 In September 1987, Barr
amended its ANDA to include paragraph IV certification.54 ICI filed an
infringement suit against Barr, which triggered the thirty-month stay of
approval.55
In April 1992, the district court declared ICI’s Tamoxifen patent
invalid and ICI appealed.56 While the appeal was pending, Zeneca (the
successor to ICI’s patent) entered into a settlement agreement with Barr
in 1993.57 The settlement agreement between Zeneca and Barr stated
that Barr would receive $21 million and a non-exclusive license to sell
Zeneca-manufactured Tamoxifen under Barr’s label.58 Additionally,
Barr agreed to change its paragraph IV certification to a paragraph III
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58

See In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896.
See Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d 1294; Schering-Plough Corp., 402 F.3d 1056.
See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323.
See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d at 190.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 193.
Id.
Id.
In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d at 193.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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certification59 and therefore not market its own generic version until
2002, when the patent expired.60 Eventually, the circuit court terminated
the litigation in response to Zeneca’s and Barr’s joint motion to dismiss
the appeal and vacate the judgment.61
Following the execution of the agreement between Zeneca and
Barr, consumers and consumer groups across the United States filed
approximately thirty lawsuits that challenged the legality of the
settlement agreement.62 The lawsuits were consolidated into a class
action that alleged the settlement agreement effectively prevented other
generic manufacturers from entering the market, directly inflating the
price of Tamoxifen.63 In dismissing the lawsuit, the district court
reasoned that while an agreement “between a monopolist and a potential
competitor ordinarily violate[s] the Sherman Act,[64] [it is] not necessarily
unlawful when the monopolist is a patent holder,” as long as the
agreement is in good faith and does not try to go beyond the scope of the
patent monopoly.65
The Second Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision,66
expressing a preference for settlement.67 The court held that reverse
payments are not per se violations of the Sherman Act because it is not
illegal for a patent holder to pay for the right to exclude68 when that right
is already granted by a patent.69 The Second Circuit also noted that
reverse payments are to be expected in a drug patent context due to the
incentives provided by the HWA.70
Addressing the plaintiff’s allegation that the mere size of reverse
payments make them unlawful, the Second Circuit reasoned that the
value of the reverse payment is of little concern as “long as the patent
litigation is neither a sham nor otherwise baseless, the patent holder is
seeking to arrive at a settlement in order to protect that to which it is
59
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(III)–(IV) (2006). A paragraph III filing certifies that
the ANDA applicant will not market the drug until the patent expires, where as a
paragraph IV filing certifies that the patent is invalid or will not be infringed when the
generic manufacturer enters the market. Id.
60
In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d at 193–94.
61
Id. at 194.
62
Id at 196.
63
Id. at 196–97.
64
The Sherman Act, or Sherman Antitrust Act is a federal statute that governs
monopolistic practices and illegal restraints of trade. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2006).
65
In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d at 197.
66
Id. at 466 F.3d at 206.
67
Id. at 202–03
68
The right to exclude is the patent holder’s statutory right to prevent others from
making or using that same invention. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2006).
69
In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d at 206.
70
Id.

2010]

STUCK IN NEUTRAL

209

presumably entitled: a lawful monopoly over the manufacture and
distribution of the patented product.”71 The plaintiffs argued that the
reverse payment was greater than what Barr could ever have made in
revenue by entering the market with its own generic product.72 The court
stated that while large payments may protect weak patents, there is no
reason to deem a patent invalid based on the size of the payment or on
the patent holder’s fear of losing the patent.73 Further, the court stated
that a rule restricting payment size would fail to give proper
consideration to the patent holder’s incentive to settle the lawsuit as an
insurance method against the possibility of losing a patent.74 Finally, the
court noted that if a patent is truly too weak, the holder of that patent will
be unable to continue making settlement payments as multiple generic
manufacturers bring successive lawsuits.75
B. The Sixth Circuit
Directly contrasting the Second Circuit, the Sixth Circuit held
reverse payments are illegal because they are unlawful restraints of
trade.76 In In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation., the settlement
agreement was between Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc. (“HMR”) and the
generic manufacturer Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Andrx”), who was
attempting to produce a generic version of HMR’s Cardizem CD, a heart
and blood pressure medication.77
Andrx filed a paragraph IV
certification in relation to HMR’s patent in late 1995.78 Subsequently,
HMR filed a patent infringement suit against Andrx, which instituted the
thirty-month stay on approval of Andrx’s paragraph IV certification.79 In
September 1997, the FDA tentatively approved80 Andrx’s paragraph IV

71

Id. at 208–09.
Id. at 208.
73
Id. at 210.
74
In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d at 210.
75
Id. at 211–12. (“There is, of course, the possibility that the patent holder will
continue to buy out potential competition . . . . We doubt, however, that this scenario is
realistic.”).
76
La. Wholesale Drug Co. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc. (In re Cardizem CD
Antitrust Litig.), 332 F.3d 896, 900 (6th Cir. 2003).
77
Id at 899, 901.
78
Id. at 902.
79
Id.
80
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2006). A generic manufacturer’s ANDA is granted
tentative approval when a brand-name manufacturer has filed an infringement action
against the generic manufacturer. Id. In such a case, the FDA has approved the
substance of generic manufacturer’s ANDA, but withholds final approval until the end of
a thirty-month stay or the infringement action reaches a conclusion, whichever is the
earlier. Id.
72
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certification.81 As a result of this development, HMR entered into a
settlement agreement with Andrx in September of 1997.82 The
agreement contained numerous provisions, including one requiring HMR
to pay $40 million per year to Andrx along with the potential of an
additional $100 million per year given a second set of conditions.83
Specifically, the agreement provided that Andrx would not produce its
generic version of Cardizem CD until (1) there was a final determination
that the Cardizem CD patent was invalid; (2) HMR and Andrx executed
a license agreement; or (3) HMR entered a license agreement with a third
party.84 Andrx also agreed to dismiss its counterclaims against HMR, “to
diligently prosecute its ANDA, and to not ‘relinquish or otherwise
compromise any right accruing thereunder or pertaining thereto,’
including its 180-day period of exclusivity.”85 In turn, HMR promised
that the previously mentioned $40 million per year payments to be made
to Andrx would begin when Andrx’s ANDA received final approval.86
HMR also promised to pay Andrx $100 million per year, less any interim
payments, when: (1) the patent was determined not infringed; (2) HMR
dismissed the infringement action; or (3) there was a final ruling that did
not decide the patent issues of validity or infringement and HMR did not
refile its infringement action.87 Finally, HMR agreed not to seek
preliminary injunctive relief in its continuing infringement litigation with
Andrx.88 This agreement ended with final payments by HMR to Andrx
totaling $89.83 million.89
Plaintiffs challenging the agreement between HMR and Andrx
commenced an action in August 1998 in the Eastern District of
Michigan.90 The plaintiffs’ claim was that but for the settlement
agreement, Andrx would have been able to bring its product to market at
a lower price than HMR and that the agreement prevented other potential
generic manufacturers from gaining market entry.91 According to the

81

In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d at 902. The tentative approval would
have become final in July 1998 following the thirty-month stay required by the
provisions of a paragraph IV certification or if HMR would have been unsuccessful in its
infringement action against Andrx, which ever would have been sooner. Id.
82
Id.
83
Id. at 902–03.
84
Id. at 902.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d at 903.
88
Id.
89
Id. at 903.
90
Id.
91
Id. at 904.
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plaintiffs, the settlement agreement amounted to an antitrust violation
under the Sherman Act.92
The Sixth Circuit concluded that the agreement was “at its core, a
horizontal agreement to eliminate competition in the market for
Cardizem CD throughout the entire United States, a classic example of
per se illegal restraint of trade.”93 The court reasoned that the settlement
agreement could not be viewed simply as an effort to impose patent
rights or as a temporary settlement to the infringement litigation.94 The
court concluded “it is one thing to take advantage of a monopoly that
naturally arises from a patent, but another thing altogether to bolster the
patent’s effectiveness in inhibiting competitors by paying the only
potential competitor $40 million per year to stay out of the market.”95
This was fundamental to the court’s holding that reverse payment
agreements are per se illegal.96 The court further reasoned that by
classifying reverse payments agreements as per se antitrust violations,
courts would be able to presume such agreements were anticompetitive
without a need to expend judicial resources to pinpoint the exact
anticompetitive effects.97
C. The Eleventh Circuit
The Eleventh Circuit addressed the issue of reverse payments in
two separate cases, Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc. 98 and
Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC.99 In both cases, the Eleventh Circuit
held that reverse payments are legal,100 effectively siding with the
Second Circuit. Essentially, the Eleventh Circuit determined that reverse
payment agreements are not per se unlawful because they do not exceed
the rights naturally granted by a patent.101
Valley Drug Co. made its way to the circuit court after the district
court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment.102
The lawsuit was filed in relation to two separate settlement agreements;
one between Abbott Laboratories (“Abbott”) and Geneva
Pharmaceuticals (“Geneva”) and another between Abbott and Zenith
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102

Id.
In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d at 908.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 909.
344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003).
402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005).
Schering-Plough Corp., 402 F.3d at 1058; Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at 1295.
Schering-Plough Corp., 402 F.3d at 1076; Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at 1306.
Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at 1295.
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Goldline Pharmaceuticals (“Zenith”).103 Abbot, the patent holder for the
drug Hytrin, entered into separate settlement agreements with the generic
manufacturers Zenith and Geneva.104
Between 1993 and 1996, Geneva submitted multiple ANDA
paragraph IV certifications related to various Hytrin patents held by
Abbott.105 With one exception, Abbott filed patent infringement suits
against Geneva for all of the paragraph IV certifications.106 Geneva
admitted to infringement but contested the validity of the patents.107
Zenith filed its ANDA paragraph IV certification in June 1994.108
Abbott subsequently filed additional patents, which forced Zenith to
amend its ANDA to bring it in line with the newly filed Abbott
patents.109 Rather than amending its ANDA, however, Zenith filed suit
against Abbott to: (1) force Abbot to delist the newly filed patents so that
Zenith could avoid amending its ANDA; and (2) secure a declaration that
it did not infringe Abbott’s patents.110 Abbott counterclaimed for
infringement.111
In March of 1998, Abbott and Zenith entered into a settlement
agreement that dismissed Zenith’s claims and Abbott’s counterclaims.112
The agreement also required Abbott to pay Zenith $3 million up front, $3
million after three months, and an additional $6 million per quarter until
March 1, 2000, as long as Zenith complied with certain clauses and
contingencies of the agreement.113 Specifically, Zenith admitted the
validity of the Abbott patents and agreed not to sell any form of the
patented drug until another party did so or the patent expired.114 Zenith
also agreed not to transfer its ANDA application to a third party or assist
any other party in the development of a generic version of Abbott’s
drug.115
One day after the execution of the agreement with Zenith, Abbott
and Geneva entered into a separate settlement agreement.116 The
103

Id. at 1296.
Id.
105
Id. at 1298–99.
106
Id. Abbott made efforts to amend one of its complaints when it was notified that it
did not file an infringement suit regarding one of the paragraph IV certifications. Id.
107
Id. at 1299.
108
Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at 1299.
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id. at 1300.
113
Id.
114
Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at 1300.
115
Id.
116
Id.
104
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agreement limited Geneva from selling or distributing any version of the
patented drug until that patent was determined to be invalid, the patent
expired, or another party began to sell a generic form of the drug.117
Geneva also promised not to transfer its 180-day exclusivity period and
to oppose any subsequent ANDA filer.118 In return, Abbott agreed to pay
Geneva $4.5 million per month until another generic manufacturer
brought its product to market or until Abbott succeeded on its
infringement claim.119
Following an action filed by the FTC, a class action suit
commenced that alleged the agreements between Abbott and each of the
generic manufacturers were per se illegal under the Sherman Act.120 On
appeal, the Eleventh Circuit held that the payments from the patent
holder to the alleged infringer did not automatically amount to a
violation of antitrust laws.121 The thrust of the Eleventh Circuit’s
argument focused on the exclusionary powers of the patent.122 The court
reasoned that while normally, a firm making monthly payments in
exchange for a competitor’s acquiescence would violate antitrust laws,
Abbott’s patent lawfully entitled it to exclude others.123 The court noted,
however, that any agreement that extends the scope of the patent might
raise antitrust concerns.124 The Eleventh Circuit also stated that even if a
patent was subsequently declared invalid, exposing the patent holder to
antitrust liability over any settlement agreement could undermine the
innovation and the incentive to file patents.125
The Eleventh Circuit addressed the issue of reverse payment
settlement agreements again in Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC.126
Similar to Valley Drug Co., the issue in Schering-Plough Corp. arose
from two settlement agreements: one between Schering-Plough Corp.
(“Schering”) and Upsher-Smith Laboratories, Inc. (“Upsher”) and a
second between Schering and ESI Lederele, Inc. (“ESI”).127 In late 1995,
Upsher filed an ANDA with paragraph IV certification for its generic
version of a Schering drug and Schering responded by filing a patent
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infringement suit.128 Before the trial began in 1997, Schering and Upsher
executed a settlement agreement.129 The agreement stated that Upsher
would delay market entry while Schering received licenses from Upsher
and agreed to make an initial payment of $60 million dollars in addition
to various milestone payments.130
Also in 1995, ESI filed an ANDA with paragraph IV
certification.131 Once again, Schering filed a patent infringement suit.132
After engaging in court-supervised mediation for fifteen months, a
settlement offer developed. Schering offered to divide the remaining
patent life with ESI.133 In addition, Schering also agreed to pay $5
million towards ESI’s legal fees and up to an additional $10 million if
ESI received FDA approval by a certain date.134
On March 30, 2001, the FTC filed an administrative complaint
against Schering, Upsher, and ESI’s parent, American Home Products
Corporation (“AHP”), alleging that the agreements were a restraint on
trade, violating both the Federal Trade Commission Act and the Sherman
Act.135 The FTC argued that when a generic company receives anything
of value to refrain or restrict its activities, an unlawful restraint on trade
results.136
The Eleventh Circuit rejected the findings of the FTC and again
turned to the exclusionary powers that are inherent to a patent.137 The
court furthered this notion, stating, “a patent holder does not incur
antitrust liability when it chooses to exclude others from producing its
patented work.”138 With respect to patent and antitrust related issues, the
court determined that one must examine: “(1) the scope of the
exclusionary potential of the patent; (2) the extent to which the
agreements exceed that scope; and (3) the resulting anticompetitive
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effects.”139 In applying this test to the facts, the Eleventh Circuit found
that the agreements did not exceed the exclusionary provisions of
Schering’s patent.140 Furthermore, the court reasoned that to prohibit
reverse payments would “reduce the incentive to challenge patents by
reducing the challenger’s settlement options should he be sued for
infringement, and so might well be thought anticompetitive.”141
D. The Federal Circuit
The Federal Circuit addressed the issue of reverse payments in In re
Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, holding that reverse
payments should remain legal because they do not extend the
exclusionary zone of the patent.142 In October 1991, Barr143 filed an
ANDA with paragraph IV certification for a generic version of the Cipro
drug patented by Bayer A.G. and Bayer Corp. (collectively “Bayer”).144
Bayer followed Barr’s ANDA with a patent infringement suit in January
1992.145 But before trial commenced, Bayer entered into an agreement
with Barr and its affiliated companies.146 In this agreement, Bayer
agreed to pay Barr $49.1 million to change its ANDA to a paragraph III
filing, which essentially required Barr to admit the validity of Bayer’s
patent and wait until the patent expired to enter the market.147 Barr also
pledged to refrain from manufacturing a generic version of Cipro in the
United States.148 In return, Bayer would provide Barr with Cipro to sell
under the Barr label or pay Barr a reverse payment once quarterly until
December 31, 2003.149 Total payments from Bayer to Barr amounted to
$398.1 million.150
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In 2000 and 2001, the settlement agreement between Bayer and
Barr was challenged by a series of antitrust actions.151 In this case, the
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, a
decision that was affirmed by the Federal Circuit.152 The Federal Circuit,
similar to the Eleventh Circuit,153 centered its argument on the
exclusionary power of a patent.154 The Federal Circuit held that “the
essence of the Agreements was to exclude the defendants from profiting
from the patented invention. This is well within Bayer’s rights as the
patentee.”155 What’s more, the court noted that the law has a longstanding policy that favors settlement and that policy applies to patent
litigation.156 The court distinguished the facts of this case from the
decision in the Sixth Circuit157 stating that the agreement in question
there required the generic manufacturer not to give-up its exclusivity
period and “provided that the generic manufacturer would not market
non-infringing versions of the generic drug. Thus, the agreement clearly
had anticompetitive effects outside the exclusion zone of the patent.”158
The court concluded that its analysis was entirely consistent with rulings
in the Second and Eleventh Circuits and with Supreme Court
precedent.159
V. THE FUTURE OF REVERSE PAYMENT AGREEMENTS
A ban on reverse payment settlements is not an appropriate solution
to the circuit split regarding the legality of such settlements for two
primary reasons. First, reverse payment settlements harmonize with the
overarching judicial policy in favor of settlement. Second, reverse
payments actually enhance competition and innovation while furthering
the purpose of the HWA. Therefore, because the Supreme Court has not
granted certiorari to settle the split on the issue, other options must be
151
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Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig.), 544 F.3d 1323, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 175-77 (1965) (recognizing that patents are an exception to
the general rule against monopolies.)).
152

2010]

STUCK IN NEUTRAL

217

explored to determine what the best solution is for reverse payment
settlements to remain presumptively legal. The best option is for
Congress to take action and provide new legislation that would clarify
the HWA and create an environment that limits reverse payments by
shifting some of the incentives currently contained in the Act. These
legislative changes would allow for closer regulation of reverse
payments while preserving the important policy considerations of
settlement and innovation.
A. Supreme Court Intervention and Judicial Solutions
While the contradiction in the circuit courts over the legality of
reverse payments is an issue ripe for Supreme Court intervention, the
Court has yet to grant certiorari.160 The Supreme Court could provide the
lower courts valuable guidance that would enable more uniform
decisions. Furthermore, because such a robust circuit split exists
regarding these reverse payments,161 the opposing views of the Sixth
Circuit (advocating a per se illegality stance) and the remaining
circuits162 (advocating for presumptive legality stance based on the
exclusionary powers of a patent and the general policy in favor of
settlement) will provide the Supreme Court with a plethora of case law
on which to base its decision.
Alternatively, some legal scholars have posited that a true circuit
split does not exist.163 The argument is that the Sixth Circuit’s decision
did not rule reverse payments to be illegal per se, but rather focused on
the illegality of agreements that affect the 180-day exclusionary period
for first filers and extended protection to products that did not infringe
the patent at issue.164 According to some scholars, the Eleventh Circuit
merely characterized the reverse payments as a troubling aspect of
settlement agreements.165 The Sixth and Eleventh Circuits’ commentary
reinforce the position that Supreme Court intervention is warranted.
Finally, because the continued legality of reverse payment
settlements is perhaps best validated by established judicial principles
that favor settlement, the Supreme Court should step in to further its
significant interest. Our courts have a “longstanding adherence to the
principle that ‘[they] are bound to encourage’ the settlement of
160

Opderbeck, supra note 15, at 1316.
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litigation.”166 Additionally, the general policy in favor of settlement
“extends to the settlement of patent infringement suits”167 because “the
nature of [it] is often inordinately complex and time consuming.”168 This
policy is critical to reverse payment settlements because the act of filing
a paragraph IV certification is considered by statute an act of patent
infringement, settlement of which would be impossible without a reverse
payment.169 Also, restricting settlement options creates an environment
where the cost of patent enforcement is effectively increased, thereby
“impair[ing] the incentives for disclosure and innovation.”170 Finally,
“[n]othing in the legislative history supports a conclusion that HatchWaxman lawsuits cannot be settled.”171
It follows that a rule that makes reverse payment settlement
agreements per se illegal would limit the options available to the
litigants.172 The district court reasoned:
If brand-name manufacturers are unable to control or limit their
risk by settling Hatch-Waxman litigation, they, like generic
manufacturers, may be less inclined to invest the research and
development (“R&D”) costs associated with bringing new drugs
to the market. The pharmaceutical industry depends greatly on
R&D and the economic returns to intellectual property created
when a successful new drug is brought to market. A rule
prohibiting settlements of Hatch-Waxman patent litigation can
have grave consequences for R&D and, in turn, severe
consequences for consumers.173

If the return-on-investment that brand-name drug companies receive
from creating intellectual property decreases, then brand-name
companies will not be able to adequately recover their research and
development costs and new drug innovation will decrease.174 This would
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2010]

STUCK IN NEUTRAL

219

result in fewer new drugs, the availability of which traditionally leads to
a healthier United States population and growth for the economy.175
B. Legislative Options
Currently, there are bills pending in the United States Senate and
the House of Representatives that would make reverse payments
illegal.176 The Senate bill would prohibit an ANDA filer from receiving
anything of value for agreeing to delay the development and deployment
of a generic drug.177 Still, some legal scholars have posited that the strict
limitations imposed by the Senate bill and a similar one in the House
would be inappropriate in the context of a patent system and unduly
hinder the rights of patent holders.178
Rather than an absolute ban on reverse payments, Professor
Christopher Holman has suggested that Congress introduce legislation
requiring fee shifting in Hatch-Waxman litigation.179 Specifically, the
hypothetical legislation would introduce a type of two-way fee shifting,
sometimes called the “British-rule,” where the loser of the litigation pays
the legal fees for both sides.180 By enacting this type of legislation,
government could generally discourage litigation in the first place and
therefore reduce the need for reverse payments.181 By forcing the loser
of the litigation to pay for all of the litigation costs, each of the parties
must take extra care in considering the merits of their case.182 This type
of legislation would influence both sides of an ANDA paragraph IV
dispute. 183
On one side, the potential of having to pay the legal fees for both
sides would presumably deter generic manufacturers from bringing
unjustifiable paragraph IV certifications with the hopes of scoring a
quick settlement from the brand-name manufacturer.184 Under such
175
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circumstances, if the generic manufacturer filed a weak paragraph IV
certification, the brand-name manufacturer would be able to recover its
legal fees for defending a patent it strongly believed was valid, when it
might have otherwise settled to avoid the costs of litigation.185 This
would add a financial risk for generic manufacturers that does not
currently exist under the HWA.186
On the other hand, this scheme would force brand-name
manufacturers to concede when one of its patent is weak or invalid.187
This is because the brand-name manufacturer would not want to risk
paying for all the litigation costs for both parties when it is likely that the
brand-name manufacturer would lose the patent as a result of the
paragraph IV litigation.188 Here, the brand-name manufacturer would be
less likely to force the generic manufacturer into expensive litigation that
might otherwise require the generic manufacturer to concede due to the
fact that the generic manufacturer typically has far less financial
resources.189 The brand-name manufacturer would no longer be able to
use its financial clout to force the generic manufacturer into a settlement
in a case where the brand-name manufacturer’s patent was weak.190 This
would serve the purpose of the HWA by overturning invalid and weak
patents.191
By preventing (1) the generic manufacturer filing a baseless
paragraph IV to obtain fast settlement payments and (2) the brand-name
manufacturers from forcing generic manufacturers into litigation over
what the brand-name manufacturer believes to be a weak or invalid
patent, the need for reverse payments can be reduced to a far more
limited set of circumstances. No longer would either litigant incur the
costs to dispute a weak argument asserted by the other party. Rather, the
parties could reserve reverse payment settlement agreements for those
circumstances where each side has a legitimate belief in the validity of its
argument, specifically, when the brand-name manufacturer believes its
patent is strong and the generic manufacturer believes the contrary. Only
then would the brand-name and generic manufacturers enter a settlement
agreement to avoid the uncertainty of patent litigation.192 The most
likely result of settlements under this set of circumstances would allow
for the generic manufacturer to get an earlier entry date and the brand185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
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name to have additional time to recoup its development costs without
either party losing the litigation and those respective benefits.193
C. Enacting Stricter Regulation and Its Impact
A ban on reverse payment settlement agreements, as proposed by
bills currently in Congress,194 would not be appropriate primarily because
of its chilling effect on the patent holder’s exclusionary rights.195 This is
a view outlined in both the Eleventh and Federal Circuits’ decisions
regarding reverse payments.196 Enforcement agencies have also weighed
in, stating that settlement agreements are not anticompetitive simply
because the agreement contains a reverse payment provision.197
Specifically, the FTC has reasoned that because of the inherent
complexity of patent litigation, any settlement agreement must be given a
meaningful evaluation, rather than be presumed illegal on its face
because of a reverse payment provision.198 Finally, legal scholars have
also supported a more lenient approach than an absolute ban on reverse
payments.199 The consensus among all of these groups indicates that the
bill currently in Congress does not properly account for the rights of a
valid patent holder.200
Experts have argued that reverse payment settlement agreements
can actually enhance competition and enable earlier entry of generic drug
products.201 For example, reverse payments provided the only avenue for
the generic manufacturers in both the Second and Federal Circuit cases
to enter the market prior to the expiration of the brand-name
manufacturers’ patents, as later cases involving those same brand-name
manufacturers and other generic companies verified the validity of the
brand-name manufacturers’ patents.202
Therefore, the generic
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Id. The generic would get an earlier entry date than waiting for the patent to expire
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manufacturers in those two cases would have been blocked from
bringing their product to market by the valid patent if not for the
settlement agreements that granted them earlier access.203
Additionally, reverse payments can also foster a procompetitive
atmosphere in two circumstances.204 The first is where the parties to the
litigation fail to assess their likelihood of a successful outcome.205 The
second is where the generic manufacturer would be willing to negotiate
an entry date, but is financially unable to maintain operations until that
date without a payment from the brand-name manufacturer.206 The first
situation is procompetitive because reverse payments allow opposing
sides to use payments to balance the risks associated with proceeding
with the unpredictability of a trial decision.207 The second situation
encourages competition, as the generic manufacturer gets the dual benefit
of payment, which keeps the generic manufacturer financially viable, and
early entry, which stimulates competition in the market.208 In sum, a ban
on reverse payment settlements, while eliminating the anticompetitive
drawbacks, would also eliminate the procompetitive incentives that allow
early entry for generics in situations where that would not otherwise be
possible.209
The ban on reverse payments and on stricter regulations regarding
these payments would also have a significantly adverse effect on the
ability of parties to settle. Any legislation that does so would cut against
the general principle that favors settlement over litigation.210 This would
present a particularly difficult problem in pharmaceutical litigation,
where settlement is already unusually hard to achieve.211 Pharmaceutical
patent litigation, however, has two distinct qualities that make patent
holders desire settlement.212 First, the patent holder has a tremendous
amount to lose if it does not succeed on its infringement claim.213
Second, patent litigation is inherently unpredictable, such that even the
most confident patent holder could be unsure as to whether a court might
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find the patent in question invalid.214 Therefore, allowing reverse
payments makes settlement possible.215 By making a reverse payment,
the patent holder is able to keep the generic company off the market and
thus make a profit in an exclusive market.216 Without the ability to make
the reverse payment as a hedge against losing at trial, the patent holder
has no incentive to settle and will await the court’s final determination on
the validity of the patent because the generic manufacturer is not going to
accept an agreement that limits market entry without some sort of
Therefore, with no way to limit the generic
compensation.217
manufacturer’s entry to the market via a settlement agreement, the patent
holder has nothing additional to lose by going to trial.
Stricter regulations such as those noted above could have a
considerable impact on the ability of parties to settle disputes in the
context of Hatch-Waxman litigation. While current proposals in
Congress aim to eliminate reverse payment agreements,218 perhaps a
more moderate alternative exists.
One possible solution is for
government to impose a statutory system that regulates reverse payment
agreements rather than banning them outright. By outlining specific
criteria that agreements must follow, the government could carefully
control what is going on in a reverse payment agreement and ensure that
the agreement does not cross the lines of antitrust law. This would not
only preserve the ability of the parties to settle, but would allow for more
regulatory oversight of the agreement. The oversight process could
include regulation of a number of areas from payment values, which
might be set based on a generic’s anticipated profit, to actual market
entry date.
In particular, the focus of any legislation that regulates reverse
payments should be on the economic terms of the agreement.
Specifically, the regulations should limit the maximum amount of a
reverse payment. The limit for the maximum payment could be based
upon the projected profit that the generic manufacturer would make by
entering the market with its own version of the brand-name
manufacturer’s drug. That maximum amount, however, should be
reduced by an amount that would reflect the cost the generic
manufacturer would incur by litigating a paragraph IV certification to
conclusion through trial with a final verdict as to the validity of the
214
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brand-name manufacturer’s patent. This reduction is necessary to
appropriately balance the rewards and risks between the brand-name
manufacturer and the generic manufacturer.
Under this proposed scheme, the generic manufacturer stands to
gain the same amount of money that it would have by successfully
litigating its paragraph IV certification and entering the market, but
without the risk of losing that litigation. The generic manufacturer
would have the incentive to settle and take the payment described
because it would not be able to gain anything additional by litigating,
other than proving the patent to be invalid or not infringed. The
reduction in the maximum payment by the amount of the generic
manufacturer’s litigation costs is necessary to avoid the situation where a
generic manufacturer files a paragraph IV certification with no intent to
actually litigate it, only hoping to get a fast settlement from the brandname manufacturer. This situation represents a bonus to the generic as
the brand-name manufacturer settles quickly to avoid the uncertainties of
litigation and the generic manufacturer has risked nothing. Meanwhile,
because the terms of any reverse payment agreement would require the
generic manufacturer to attest to the validity of the brand-name
manufacturer’s patent, the generic manufacturer should only want to
litigate in a situation where it was confident that it would win the
paragraph IV litigation. This is because winning the paragraph IV
litigation would allow the generic manufacturer to enter the market
immediately and is the only benefit that the generic manufacturer could
obtain going through litigation.
On the other side, the brand-name manufacturer gains the
advantage of keeping its exclusive use of the market without incurring
costs to litigate and risk a loss in paragraph IV litigation. This retention
of an exclusive market is critical because it gives the brand-name
manufacturer more time to recoup its investment in the drug
development process.219 Moreover, when the brand-name manufacturer
is allowed to settle through a reverse payment it avoids the costs of
litigation that can also hurt the brand-name manufacturer’s profits. The
more efficiently a brand-name manufacturer recovers its investment in a
drug and begins earning a profit from it, the sooner the brand-name
manufacturer can reinvest those profits in future drug development and
innovation.220

219

Kadura, supra note 2, at 650.
Christopher Lea Lockwood, Comment, Biotechnology Industry Organization v.
District of Columbia: A Preemptive Strike Against State Price Restrictions on
Prescription Pharmaceuticals, 19 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 143, 167 (2009).
220

2010]

STUCK IN NEUTRAL

225

Additionally, this scheme would be assisted by requiring the
reverse payment agreement to include an early market entry provision
that would allow the generic manufacturer to enter the market at some
point earlier than the end of the brand-name manufacturer’s patent term.
This early market entry should be regulated using a set of guidelines that
would attempt to provide benefits to both the parties. In particular, the
brand-name manufacturer and the generic manufacturer should split the
remaining term of the brand-name manufacturer’s patent. For half of
that period, the brand-name manufacturer would continue to enjoy its
complete and total market exclusivity. Then, in the second half of the
remaining patent term, the generic manufacturer would be allowed to
enter the market. Significantly, however, the brand-name manufacturer
and the generic manufacturer would be forced to enter into a licensing
agreement for this remaining term of the patent. This is because the
brand-name manufacturer still has its patent rights, as the patent is
presumptively valid. Therefore, the generic manufacturer must pay the
brand-name manufacturer for the right to use that technology.
The benefits of the above licensing scheme would be two-fold.
First, the brand-name manufacturer would be able to recover more of its
investment through licensing fees. Second, the generic would be allowed
to enter the market earlier than would have otherwise been possible due
to the patent right of the brand-name manufacturer. The earlier entry of
the generic would be a benefit to consumers because the generic
manufacturer would be able to offer lower prices for its version of the
patented drug.221 Then upon the expiration of the patent, the generic
could enter the market without paying licensing fees and the price of the
generic version of the drug would presumably drop again, which is a
further benefit to consumers.
D. Reverse Payments Serve the Purposes of the Hatch-Waxman Act
“The Hatch-Waxman Act was enacted in 1984 with the dual
purposes of reimbursing pharmaceutical patent holders for time lost on
the effective life of the patent due to the approval process of the FDA
while also encouraging generic drug manufacturers to enter the market,
including providing incentives to challenge invalid patents or develop
non-infringing drugs.”222 Prior to the HWA, only thirty-five percent of
brand-name drugs generated generic competitors.223 This is no longer
the case today, as virtually all patented drugs spawn a generic
221
222
223
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competitor.224 Reverse payment settlements have generally contributed
to this trend. For example, generic forms of Prozac and Paxil entered the
market three years early and saved consumers an estimated $2.5 billion
and $2 billion, respectively.225 A generic form of Prilosec came to
market fifteen years before its patents expired, saving consumers an
estimated $360 million per year.226
Reverse payments also serve the HWA’s purpose of providing a
brand-name manufacturer patent term extension so that the brand-name
manufacturer can recoup more of its development costs.227 In the case of
a reverse payment, the circumstances are more like a “quasi-patent term”
extension because a settlement agreement extends the brand-name
company’s patent rights in instances where the generic would have been
successful in its paragraph IV filing.228 On the other hand, a settlement
agreement forces the brand-name manufacturer to give up its patent
rights earlier than would be required when the brand successfully
defends against a generic company’s paragraph IV filing.229 Extended
market exclusivity is critical because it allows the brand-name to recoup
more of its investment.230 When a brand-name is able to recoup more of
its investment, it is able to reinvest more in future development.231
Without recovering investment, brand-name manufacturers would not be
able to produce today’s ground-breaking new drugs.”232 It follows that
without these brand-name drugs there would be nothing for the generic
manufacturers to replicate and learn from, but more importantly “there
would be little hope of finding new treatments and cures,” because
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innovation would become prohibitively expensive for brand-name
manufacturers233
VI. CONCLUSION
Reverse payment agreements should continue as legal and
exploitable methods of resolving litigation under the HWA because they
serve the Act’s purpose of allowing generic drug manufacturers to have a
more efficient route in gaining approval for their product so that they
may bring it to the market. The Act establishes a statutory structure that
encourages reverse payment settlement agreements. These agreements
have been the topic of scholarly, regulatory, and even circuit court debate
because these payments raise possible antitrust violations. One view,
expressed by the Sixth Circuit and certain experts, reasons that such
payments should be per se illegal, as they do in fact violate antitrust
laws. Nonetheless, to make a blanket decree that these reverse payments
are per se illegal is not sound policy and could result in more negative
consequences. Furthermore, creating a per se illegality standard for
reverse payment agreements clashes with patent law’s exclusionary
principals. Therefore, the decisions rendered in the Second and Federal
Circuits represent a more sound policy that reverse payments should be
presumed legal. As long as these reverse payments do not extend the
scope of the patent, they are not creating a restraint of trade that would
not already exist via the monopoly granted by a patent. Taking away the
ability to enter into a reverse payment settlement eliminates one of the
major advantages and reasons to settle patent disputes without litigation.
This effect goes against the longstanding policy of favoring settlement
over litigation and is perhaps the best reason for allowing reverse
payment settlements to continue. Finally, reverse payments have
become an important by-product of the HWA. In many cases reverse
payments further the Act’s purpose of granting generic drug
manufacturers earlier access to the market, thereby providing consumers
with more affordable generic drugs.
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